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1 Freiling’s Darts: Denying the Continuum Hypothesis by
Intuition
It is well-known that the Continuum Hypothesis (CH) is independent of the other axioms of Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory, taken to include the Axiom of Choice (AC). This formulation of set theory,
conventionally denoted ZFC, is generally taken as the most well-justified foundation for mathematics
in a logicist-realist framework. On a realist view, the axioms of ZFC are taken to be intuitively
justified by correspondence with reality. This raises the question of whether an intuitive justification
exists for CH as an additional axiom, or conversely whether it is more intuitive to deny CH.
Some years ago, Freiling [1] provided an intuitive argument for an axiom that, when appended
to ZFC, is equivalent to the denial of CH. Stated somewhat loosely, Freiling’s Axiom of Symmetry
(AS) is the following:
Postulate 1 (Axiom of Symmetry) Given any function f : R 7→ Rℵ0 that assigns to any real
number x a countable set of real numbers f(x) = Sx ⊂ R, there exist x, y ∈ R such that y 6∈ f(x)
and x 6∈ f(y).
The crucial aspect of this postulate is that it applies to any function f mapping individual real
numbers to countable sets. The reader should have little difficulty finding many examples of specific
functions f for which AS is evidently true: it is the extension to all such functions that takes AS
beyond the obvious.
The intuitive argument for AS—with the interval [0, 1] in place of R, which introduces no par-
ticular difficulty as the two sets have the same cardinality—is as follows.
Consider the uniform probability distribution on [0, 1], and sample two independent random
variables X and Y with this distribution. (Freiling asks us to imagine two dart throwers who each
aim randomly at the interval and act independently of one another.) Let the respective sample
points be x and y. Now consider the countable sets Sx and Sy that the function f associates with
x and y. Because Sx is countable and [0, 1] is not, it is intuitively practically certain that it does
not contain the random sample y ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, as Sy is countable, it almost certainly does not
contain x. (Again intuitively, one may assert that if we have been unfortunate enough to pick one of
the sporadic cases x ∈ Sy, or vice versa, we could just take new samples x, y and repeat until with
practical certainty we find values satisfying AS.)
The appeal to intuition is required in this argument because AS is equivalent in ZFC to the
denial of CH (as will be shown shortly), and we have known since Go¨del that CH is consistent with
ZFC. This implies that AS has no proof as a theorem of ZFC. Where Freiling’s argument relies on
intuition is its appeal to statements of probability: namely that Pr[x ∈ Sy] = 0 and Pr[y ∈ Sx] = 0
because Sx and Sy are countable, hence x and y satisfying AS can be found with ‘effective certainty’.
Ascribing probabilities to arbitrary subsets of R is a fraught exercise in general, because rigorous
probability statements about infinite sets require the sets to be measurable, and in ZFC there are
subsets of R that fail to be measurable, whether according to the usual Lebesgue measure on R
or with respect to any other countably additive measure. Freiling’s argument manages to avoid
this immediate problem, because countable additivity ensures that any countable set has Lebesgue
measure zero. But a leap of intuition is necessary in order to proceed from the probability statement
to a guarantee that x 6∈ Sy ∧ y 6∈ Sx will (often enough) be the case in practice. This is particularly
so when the sets Sx and Sy have ‘fractal’ structure that forbids any intuitive attempt to reason
directly about sampling events involving these sets.
Sets with such complex structure are involved in most of the interesting applications of AS; in
particular the proof that in ZFC it implies the denial of CH. This proof goes through as follows.
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AC is equivalent to the proposition that every set can be well-ordered, so let ≺ denote a relation
that well-orders [0, 1] and let f be the function that assigns to each x ∈ [0, 1] the set of all numbers
that precede x in the well-ordering, together with x. That is, f(x) = {x} ∪ {t : t ∈ [0, 1], t ≺ x}.
It is a theorem of ZFC that any initial segment of a well-ordering on [0, 1], and therefore each f(x)
for arbitrary x, has cardinality strictly less than that of [0, 1]. Therefore, if CH is true and the only
infinite cardinal less than Card([0, 1]) = 2ℵ0 is ℵ0, then f(x) for any x has maximum cardinality ℵ0
and is countable. AS therefore applies and asserts that there exist x, y with y ≻ x and x ≻ y, a
contradiction.
The argument for AS has attracted its fair share of objections, not least because in a sense it is
too persuasive. If arbitrary countable sets satisfy AS because they have zero probability relative to a
uniform distribution on a real interval, could the same intuition suggest the same for any sets having
cardinality less than 2ℵ0 , even if these may fail to be countable or indeed measurable? Freiling’s
argument can easily be taken as suggesting an intuitive concept of ‘meagre probability’ that relies
not on strict measure theory, but simply on the cardinality of an ‘event’ set relative to the ‘ambient’
set. It would therefore appear intuitive to assert the following stronger version of AS (call it SAS):
Postulate 2 (Strong Axiom of Symmetry) Given any function f : R 7→ R<2ℵ0 that assigns to
any real number x a set of real numbers f(x) = Sx ⊂ R of cardinality less than that of R, there exist
x, y ∈ R such that y 6∈ f(x) and x 6∈ f(y).
Yet if one does admit SAS, one can no longer assert AC! After all, the same argument above that
refutes CH will, given SAS, disallow any well-ordering of [0, 1]—thereby implying the negation of
AC. It appears that Freiling himself in [1] was persuaded by the “case against AC” implied by SAS
(while ultimately settling for a version of SAS asserted only for sets f(x) of Lebesgue measure zero).
Most theorists baulk at dropping AC from set theory given it provides a convenient framework
for much of modern analysis (for example, by allowing the assertion that every vector space has a
basis)—not to mention that strong intuitive arguments can be mounted for AC itself [2, 3].
Commentators on Freiling such as Devlin [4] and Brown [5] concede that the dart-throwing argu-
ment for AS is fundamentally intuitive and not rigorous. Nonetheless, they are strongly persuaded
by the argument—and by extension its refutation of CH—though they regard intuition alone as too
weak to support SAS. It is the intuitive content of Freiling’s argument for AS, specifically the appeal
to probabilities, that this note seeks to explore.
2 The Inclusion Property: Unbelievable Monster, or Mere
Counterexample?
Abram [6] treats AS from the converse standpoint: though the two statements are equivalent, one
may choose to emphasise whether AS provides a denial of CH, or conversely, whether CH provides
a counterexample to AS. In Abram’s view there is little to guide one’s intuition apart from prior
convictions about the validity of CH. Given the relatively straightforward counterexample furnished
by CH, it may be that one’s intuition about AS itself is faulty:
That under the Continuum Hypothesis we may conceive of a specific function that negates
the Axiom of Symmetry is a strong indication that the intuition of the axiom may
be flawed (as intuition so commonly is). Indeed, the negation of Freiling’s Axiom of
Symmetry is no more counterintuitive than that of a space-filling curve or a nowhere
differentiable, everywhere continuous function, but these objects are known to exist.
Indeed, the following is a straightforward corollary of the well-ordering principle and standard
results about well-orderings.
Theorem of ZFC Given any set Ω, there exists a function f : Ω 7→ P(Ω), assigning to each element
of Ω a subset of Ω with the following properties:
1. For any x, y ∈ Ω distinct, either f(x) ⊂ f(y) or f(y) ⊂ f(x). Also, x ∈ f(x) for any x.
2. If Ω ⊆ R, then f(x) for any x has cardinality less than 2ℵ0 .
The explicit construction of f(x), as the initial segment to x of a well-ordering ≺ on Ω (which exists
by virtue of AC), was given above. Property 1 is called here the inclusion property: it follows directly
from the equivalent property for two initial segments of a well-ordering. Property 2 is a consequence
of the fact that all initial segments have a unique order type: accordingly no initial segment of a
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well-ordering of R can attain the order type of R itself and so must in turn be of lesser cardinality
than Card(R) = 2ℵ0 . This remains true if one restricts the well-ordering and its initial segments to
any subset of R.
Abram’s point above is well made: in postulating that there is a function f with the inclusion
property, there is no greater affront to intuition than implied by the notion of a well-ordering of R
(a firm consequence of AC). But nor does it particularly offend one’s intuition to affirm, accepting
CH, that all of the subsets assigned by f are in addition countable. Then, however, it contradicts
the intuitive justification for AS.
3 The Problem is Independence
But consider the statement of AS again: it asserts the existence of x and y such that y 6∈ f(x)
and x 6∈ f(y). So it is asserting the truth of a joint proposition for some choice of x and y. Yet,
it seeks to assert this on probabilistic grounds: stated more explicitly, the argument is that the
separate ‘events’ y 6∈ f(x) and x 6∈ f(y) are each true with probability 1, hence the joint ‘event’
y 6∈ f(x) ∧ x 6∈ f(y) is also true with probability 1 owing to the ‘independent’ choice of x and y.
It may be, however, that AS is relying for its intuitive appeal on a mistaken notion of inde-
pendence. In probability calculus, the probability of a joint event is given as the product of the
probability of one event alone, and another probability conditional on that event:
Pr[a ∧ b] = Pr[a] Pr[b|a] = Pr[b] Pr[a|b] . (1)
To assert that events a and b are independent is to assert that the conditional probabilities Pr[a|b]
and Pr[b|a] do not differ from the unqualified probabilities, Pr[a] and Pr[b] respectively. But if a
conditional probability, say Pr[b|a], does differ from Pr[b], this does not necessarily mean that a has
any causal influence on b: it means rather that there is some essential logical connection between the
two events. If Mary places a red card and a black card in two separate sealed envelopes and John
selects one at random, then a week later John opens his envelope and finds a red card, this does not
cause the card in Mary’s remaining envelope to be black: yet without knowing the contents of any
envelope one may justly state that Pr[B] = 1/2, Pr[B|r] = 1 and Pr[B|b] = 0, where B is the event
‘the card in Mary’s envelope is black’, while r, b are the events ‘the card in John’s envelope is red
(respectively, black)’. The events B and b are not independent.
In the Freiling thought experiment, the sampling probabilities for x and y are indeed independent,
by stipulation. But does this independence automatically extend to the sets f(x) and f(y)? Here
is the crucial importance of the inclusion property: it creates a logical connection between the sets
f(x) and f(y) (one must include the other) even where there is none between the points x and y
themselves. A logical connection is likewise created between the events y 6∈ f(x) and x 6∈ f(y), so
that for example
Pr[y 6∈ f(x)] = 1, yet Pr[y 6∈ f(x) |x 6∈ f(y)] = 0. (2)
The formula on the right is in fact a purely logical statement expressed in probability calculus, a
consequence of the inclusion property of f . Given the truth of the proposition x 6∈ f(y), it must
follow that f(x) 6⊂ f(y) (since x ∈ f(x)), and hence f(y) ⊂ f(x) (since either f(x) ⊂ f(y) or
f(y) ⊂ f(x) is true). But now y ∈ f(y) ⊂ f(x), and therefore y 6∈ f(x) is a false statement and
must be assigned probability 0.
A similar line of reasoning establishes that Pr[x 6∈ f(y) | y 6∈ f(x)] = 0: the logical symmetry is
preserved. Notice again that the essential relationships are logical, not causal. It is irrelevant which
of x and y are sampled ‘first’: the only question is whether f(x) covers f(y) (in which case y 6∈ f(x)
is not satisfied) or whether f(x) is covered by f(y) (in which case x 6∈ f(y) is not satisfied). One or
other will be true in any case. Meanwhile, (1) ensures that while y 6∈ f(x) and x 6∈ f(y) individually
have probability 1, their conjunction has probability 0 when f satisfies the inclusion property.
Once again, there is no necessary offence to intuition involved. Just as dense sets can have
an empty intersection, so events that are intuitively ‘almost certainly true’ on their own can still
be mutually exclusive if there is an underlying correlation. Consider a scenario with N envelopes
distributed one by one to N persons P1, P2, . . . , PN : each envelope contains a red card apart from
one which has been selected at random to contain a black card. If N is large enough, the probability
of the event Ek : ‘person Pk has a red card’ can be asserted as close to 1 as desired absent knowing
which envelope contains the black card; yet the conjunction of all the ‘almost true’ events Ek is
demonstrably false.
So it may be with Freiling’s Axiom: here there are only two events, yet one should not leap too
readily from valid intuitions about events in isolation to reason about the joint event.
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